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Abstract 
This paper examines the possible positive and negative effects that the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) can have on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Accordingly, 
the thesis will analyse these effects to determine whether the TPP could ultimately serve 
as a tool for improving or crippling the CSR practices of corporations within TPP 
States.  
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises 11991 words. 
 
 
Subjects and Topics 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
Corporate Social Responsibility, and 
Corporate Law.  
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“Ethics is the new competitive environment.”1 
 
I Introduction  
 
In recent years, transnational business has surged, owing to improved internet services, 
reliable distance payment methods, prompt transport of goods and a greater reach to 
consumers worldwide. This growth has been further fuelled by Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) which eliminate cross-border trade barriers such as customs duties and import 
and export taxes.  
 
The latest FTA is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),2 recently signed by 12 Pacific 
Rim countries: New Zealand, Australia, United States, Canada, Mexico, Japan, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, Peru and Chile. The Agreement was recently 
signed in Auckland but is yet to be ratified by the Parties. It aims to promote trade and 
investment, achieve economic growth and increase trade opportunities across the 12 
Parties.3  
 
The facilitation of international trade by the TPP is likely to increase transnational 
business activities through multinational companies and overseas subsidiaries, 
especially where investors from developed TPP countries (such as the United States) 
can secure better business deals in countries with lower production costs and minimum 
wages (such as Vietnam). This would increase the volume of business being conducted 
beyond their parent jurisdictions on a regular basis. Rules of international law act as a 
shield to prevent these businesses being regulated by the domestic laws applicable to 
their parent companies. This allows foreign subsidiaries and sub-contractors to exploit 
their legal immunity and violate laws outside their parent jurisdiction without holding 
the parent company accountable for their actions.  
 
In recent times, this has led to the devastating abuse of employees and the environment 
as a result of parent companies turning a blind eye to the actions of subsidiaries or 
subcontractors. One such example was the suicide scandal at Foxconn Technology 
Group in China, a subcontractor which manufactured electronics for the US-based 
company, Apple Inc.4 Due to horrifying work conditions and human rights abuse at the 
factory, Foxconn employees committed suicide at the company premises, causing 
Foxconn to respond by merely installing “suicide nets” around the factory. Despite the 
  
1 Peter Robinson, CEO at Mountain Equipment Co-op; found at InterPraxis <www.interpraxis.com>. 
2 Trans-Pacific Partnership (opened for signature 4 February 2016); hereinafter referred to as “TPP”. 
3 Trans-Pacific Partnership, preamble.  
4 Rob Cooper “Inside Apple’s Chinese ‘sweatshop’ factory where workers are paid just £1.12 per hour 
to produce iPhones and iPads for the West” Daily Mail (online ed, United Kingdom, 25 January 2013). 
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alarming implications of these events, Apple faced no legal consequences whatsoever 
as they were under no obligation to account for the production of its goods in foreign 
jurisdictions through subcontractors. In this manner, international trade via 
multinational companies, subsidiaries and subcontractors gives (parent) companies an 
avenue to produce goods by violating labour and environmental protection laws, for 
lesser costs, with no requirement to be liable or accountable. 
 
Increased trade and FTAs can also cause regulatory competition, whereby States 
‘compete’ to offer the most attractive business environments for investors. This could 
result in a ‘race to the bottom’ when countries compete to provide the least costly 
business environment,5 by relaxing employee protection laws (such as those regulating 
minimum wage and work hours) and environment protection laws (such as providing 
for the disposal of hazardous waste). This could also pressure developed countries with 
stringent domestic laws to dilute their laws to level the playing field and compete with 
countries having lax regulations. This further facilitates the process by which parent 
companies can discount the actions of subsidiaries and subcontractors operating in other 
countries.  
 
Under these circumstances, it is important that this accountability deficit is addressed 
by FTAs such as the TPP, which can bind a large population of traders. One possible 
method by which the TPP can oblige accountability is through the concept of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR). The text of the TPP explicitly provides for CSR in a 
number of chapters, and additionally contains entire chapters dedicated to the protection 
of obligations related to CSR, such as labour rights and environmental protection. The 
TPP is regarded as the world’s largest trade deal which includes the world’s largest and 
third largest economies,6 and accordingly has far-reaching powers to implement these 
provisions on a more global scale. If the TPP is ratified, numerous economies and 
businesses could be subject to these CSR provisions of the TPP, thereby promoting and 
increasing accountability.  
 
This paper aims to determine whether the TPP promotes or hinders CSR obligations of 
corporations which are not presently accountable under existing laws.7 Relevant 
provisions of the TPP will be examined in detail to determine the potential effects they 
  
5 Aseem Prakash and Matthew Potoski “Racing to the Bottom? Trade, Environmental Governance and 
ISO 14001.” (2006) 50(2) Am J Polit Sci 350 at 359. 
6 Tim Worstall “The TPP, World's Largest Trade Pact, Finally Gets Signed” Forbes (online ed, United 
States 4 February 2016); Rebecca Howard “Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal signed, but years of 
negotiations still to come” Reuters (online ed, Wellington, 4 February 2016). 
7 P Blumberg “Asserting Human Rights against Multinational Corporations under United States Law: 
Conceptual and Procedural Problems” (2002) 50 Am J Comp L 493 at 494. 
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could have on labour and environmental law and whether corporations could be held 
accountable under such laws. If it is found that the TPP has positive effects on the 
implementation and enforcement of CSR, it could then be concluded that the TPP is an 
appropriate instrument to fill the regulatory gap in accountability through CSR 
practices.  
 
II What is CSR? 
 
CSR can be defined as the notion that companies are accountable for the consequences 
of their activities on their employees, the society and the environment.8 There are 
several aspects to CSR: promoting transparency, accountability, protection of human 
rights, protection of the environment, promoting ethical behaviour and exceeding 
legally binding norms.9 It encapsulates the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary 
or philanthropic expectations that society has of organisations.10 CSR obligations often 
go beyond what is required by law, and are, as a result, voluntarily adopted by 
companies to promote their brand image and company reputation. The rationale behind 
imposing such extralegal obligations is that companies, as separate legal entities with 
enforceable legal rights, should have similar (albeit, non-legal) responsibilities. It also 
would be unreasonable to allow companies to enjoy the benefits of profit-making 
without the burden of responsibility and accountability towards the sources of the 
profits made.11 
A The Development of the Concept of CSR 
The concept of CSR is not new. From the late 19th to early 20th centuries, legal and 
organisational transformations created large companies which were more widely owned 
by larger numbers of owners. Consequently, the traditional influence held by owners 
over managers and directors of the company dwindled.12 This correlates with the 
decision in Salomon v Salomon,13 which established that companies are separate legal 
entities from their owners. This concept created a "corporate veil" which shielded 
  
8 Alwyn Lim and Kiyoteru Tsutsui “The social regulation of the economy in the global context” in 
Kiyoteru Tsutsui and Alwyn Lim (ed) Corporate Social Responsibility in Globalizing World (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2015) 1 at 1. 
9 United Nations Environment Programme Corporate Social Responsibility and Regional Trade and 
Investment Agreements (DTI/1429/GE, 2011) at 17. 
10 W Visser and others The A to Z of Corporate Social Responsibility (John Wiley & Sons, West Sussex, 
2007) at 107.  
11 Cooper, above n 4. 
12 Stephen J Brammer and Stephen Pavelin “Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility” 
in Mike Wright and others (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2013) 719 at 719. 
13 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 (HL). 
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owners from liability for the actions of their corporations, and could only be lifted in 
exceptional circumstances.14 Subsequent rulings such as that in Adams v Cape 
Industries Plc demonstrate that Courts generally upheld this concept of a separate legal 
personality created by the corporate veil, when it refused to lift the veil to hold a parent 
company responsible for the actions of its subsidiaries.15  
 
This level of protection afforded to shareholders and parent companies meant that they 
would no longer be held accountable for effects the business may have on society and 
the environment. Over time, owners and parent companies began to increase the scale 
of risk-taking, protected by the corporate veil and the separate legal entity, with no 
threat of liability.16 These trends called for the formation new systems of accountability 
whereby companies could be held accountable to affected persons. The notion of 
corporate governance was subsequently introduced to ensure accountability to the 
owners of a company, but it did not create obligations to be accountable towards other 
stakeholders.17  
 
The continued need to hold companies accountable to the wider society was 
accompanied by the belief that issues such as human and employee rights and 
environmental protection could accompany profit-maximisation goals, leading to what 
is now known as the "Triple Bottom Line" framework.18 Compliance with the Triple 
Bottom Line framework fulfilled business obligations towards people, the planet and 
profit-making purposes. This practice gradually developed into the present-day concept 
of CSR which promotes accountability towards employees, society and the 
environment.  
B Justifying the Need for CSR 
A plethora of material can be found which highlights the importance of CSR. Apart 
from its capacity to regulate human rights and environmental effects along supply 
chains and overseas jurisdictions, CSR also offers various economic benefits. Studies 
have shown CSR measures to increase profits and cut down costs in the long run, owing 
to resource efficiency and recycling.19 One study has found CSR to decrease production 
inefficiencies, reduce risks and simultaneously, increase sales, leading companies to 
  
14 Where a company is established as a mere facade or is acting as an agent of the parent company, as 
established in Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch 433 (CA). 
15 Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch 433 (CA). 
16 Brammer and Pavelin, above n 12, at 719. 
17 Brammer and Pavelin, above n 12, at 721. 
18 A Gill “Corporate Governance as Corporate Social Responsibility: A Research Agency” (2008) 26(2) 
Berk J Intl L 452 at 461. 
19 United Nations Environment Programme, above n 9, at 14. 
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become more profitable over time.20 Implementing such measures can also enhance 
brand image and promote sustainable development,21 which may be more appealing to 
stakeholders and consumers. The practice of CSR can also contribute to reputational 
capital of a company and generate customer loyalty. For instance, when the New York 
plant Merck & Co Inc leaked toxic chemicals into a river, the company avoided severe 
backlash due to exemplary CSR practices in the past.22 Governments may also be 
inclined to encourage corporations to practice CSR to avoid political embarrassment 
and bad publicity when corporations within their jurisdiction act irresponsibly.  
 
Nonetheless, the need for CSR is greatly debated, with most scholars siding with one 
of two theories for and against the concept of CSR. The first theory, which supports 
CSR considers that corporations, being separate legal persons in the eyes of the law, 
have their own moral personhood and therefore can be held morally responsible for 
their actions.23 This view is supported by scholars such as Keith Davis, CC Walton and 
KR Andrews, who assert that corporations have considerable power which entails 
responsibility, and therefore, corporations have responsibilities beyond those that are 
economic and legal.24 In contrast, the second theory, known as Fundamentalism, argues 
against CSR with the contention that the only social responsibility of businesses is to 
maximise its profits in compliance with the law.25 This argument has been spearheaded 
by scholars such as Milton Friedman, who maintain that the imposition of social 
responsibilities would "undermine the very foundations of ... free society".26  
 
However, this perspective overlooks the collateral damage caused by businesses which 
neglect social responsibilities and focus purely on profit-making objectives. Business 
activities of certain corporations (for example, the production of textiles or the mining 
of natural resources) can cause pollution, spread disease and cause conflicts over land 
rights.27 Such problems cannot be solved by corporations satisfying their profit-earning 
obligations towards shareholders. Moreover, the long-term costs incurred by liability 
  
20 Jose M Cruz and Tina Wakolbinger “Multiperiod effects of corporate social responsibility on supply 
chain networks, transaction costs, emissions, and risk” (2008) 116 Int J Production Economics 61 at 72. 
21 Jennifer A Zerk Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility: Limitations and Opportunities in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) at 157. 
22 Cruz and Wakolbinger, above n 20, at 62. 
23 Domènec Melé "Corporate Social Responsibility Theories" in Andrew Crane and others (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) at 48. 
24 Andrew Crane and others (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2008) at 56. 
25 Melé, above n 23, at 47-48. 
26 Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1962) at 133.  
27 United Nations Environment Programme, above n 9, at 13. 
10 The Trans-Pacific Partnership – A Bane or Boon to Corporate Social Responsibility? 
 
for pollution, compliance with regulation, use of hazardous raw material, production of 
hazardous waste and health and safety issues are found to be higher than the short-term 
costs of implementing CSR,28 thereby undermining the profit-making obligations in the 
long run.  
 
The failure of the law to monitor and control the damaging actions of businesses 
highlights the pressing need for extra-legal regulation. These issues need to be 
addressed with regard to corporations’ obligations towards other stakeholders. It could 
therefore be deemed that CSR could hold the answer to such problems, and accordingly, 
corporations should practice CSR over the course of business. 
C Existing Measures Promoting CSR 
1 International initiatives  
CSR is encouraged by numerous international organisations which monitor CSR 
activities within companies. Various binding conventions as well as non-binding 
guidelines, standards and initiatives have also been introduced by the United Nations 
(UN),29 International Labour Organization (ILO),30 the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD),31 and the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO).32  
 
The UN Commission on Human Rights attempted to implement a set of CSR norms 
which would bind multinational companies, but the proposal was unsuccessful, and 
other possible systems are currently being deliberated.33 The European Commission 
has introduced a successful CSR policy,34 but this can only be enforced within the 
European Union. 
 
  
28 Cruz and Wakolbinger, above n 20, at 72. 
29 For example, the United Nations Global Compact, found at <www.unglobalcompact.org>. 
30 For example, Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (ILO No 105) 320 UNTS 291 (opened for 
signature 25 June 1957, entered into force 17 January 1959), Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organise Convention (ILO No 87) 68 UNTS 17 (opened for signature 9 July 1948, entered 
into force 4 July 1950) and Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (ILO No 182) 2133 UNTS 161 (opened for signature 
17 June 1999, entered into force 19 November 2000). 
31 For example, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 2011. 
32 For example, ISO 26000:2010 Social Responsibility (2010). 
33 Joshua Waleson “Corporate Social Responsibility in EU Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement: 
Towards Sustainable Trade and Investment” (2015) 42(2) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 143 at 
151. 
34 European Commission A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility 
(COM/2011/0681 FINAL, 25 October 2011). 
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Various international trade agreements (prior to the TPP) also directly and indirectly 
promote CSR. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) included two 
supplementary agreements which addressed labour and environmental concerns which 
arose over the course of transnational trade.35 The United States-Peru and Canada-Peru 
FTAs (both of 2009) are among the FTAs in the world to directly promote CSR by 
explicitly referring to “corporate social responsibility” as opposed to labour or 
environment concerns.36 The TPP is now the most recent FTA to include CSR 
provisions within the text of the Agreement  
2 Domestic measures  
Certain countries have taken the initiative to include CSR provisions within State 
legislation. The United Kingdom Companies Act imposes a duty on directors to have 
regard to the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment.37 The Companies Act of India requires certain companies to form a CSR 
Committee and implement a CSR policy within the company.38 The State-Owned 
Enterprises Act of New Zealand calls for State-owned enterprises to exhibit “a sense of 
social responsibility”.39  
 
Some States promote CSR through non-binding means. In the United States, the 
Department of State monitors CSR and provides guidance and support for businesses 
engaging in CSR practices.40 The United States Secretary of State also administers the 
‘Award for Corporate Excellence’, to send a signal of the country's commitment to 
further CSR.41 Various government departments have also made CSR practices more 
attractive by granting business licences and permissions which are conditional on 
integrity and disclosure of performance, introducing whistle-blower protection, 
government sponsored auditing schemes and tax incentives.42 In Mexico, qualifying 
companies can be certified as being sustainable, following voluntary biennial audits.43 
The Canadian government promotes awareness and understanding of CSR matters by 
funding conferences and workshops, involving companies, representatives of host 
  
35 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 32 ILM 289, 605 (1993) (opened for signature 17 
December 1992, entered into force 1 January 1994). 
36 United Nations Environment Programme, above n 9, at 7. 
37 Companies Act 2006 (UK), s 172(1)(d). 
38 The Companies Act 2013 (India), s 135. 
39 State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 4(1)(c). 
40 United States Department of State “Corporate Social Responsibility” <www.state.gov>. 
41 United States Department of State “Secretary of State’s Award for Corporate Excellence” 
<www.state.gov>. 
42 Gill, above n 18, at 470. 
43 For more information, see <www.profepa.gob.mx>. 
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governments.44 It has also set up the Office of the Extractive Sector Corporate Social 
Responsibility Counsellor which helps reduce and resolve conflicts between companies 
involved in extracting coal, oil and gas and affected communities overseas.45 Although 
these initiatives do not bind or compel companies to be socially responsible, they 
provide a strong incentive to do so by offering benefits and attractions.   
3 CSR measures taken by companies 
Domestic measures are only applicable to companies operating within the limit of that 
particular State jurisdiction and do not control actions along global supply chains. 
Companies have consequently developed supplementary means of implementing CSR 
along entire supply chains. This reduces the risk of human rights abuse and damage to 
the environment and offers protection beyond the home jurisdiction of the parent 
company.  
 
A large number of multinational companies have introduced codes of conduct 
composed of various guidelines and standards,46 including social, labour and 
environmental requirements which go beyond the business activities of the 
implementing organisation.47 Codes of conduct often operate on the basis of “comply 
or explain”, where suppliers are required to comply with the code or explain as to why 
they have not been complied with. However, companies can encounter various 
problems when codes of conduct are introduced. The company initiating the code holds 
responsibility of governance of all the companies within the supply chain to guarantee 
compliance of the code.48 This may be difficult where the supply chain spans across a 
number of countries with different legal and cultural backgrounds. Moreover, codes of 
conduct are “vague and poorly monitored”, and are generally not actionable for 
breach.49 Furthermore, companies often wish to maintain good, long-term relationships 
with suppliers and may be reluctant to take action against non-complying suppliers. 
Unequal bargaining power within the supply chain, especially in regard to small 
businesses, may also make it difficult to impose and enforce codes of conduct.  
 
  
44 “Corporate Social Responsibility” Global Affairs Canada <www.international.gc.ca>. 
45 “Office of the Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Counsellor” Global Affairs 
Canada <www.international.gc.ca>. 
46 Esben Rahbek Pedersen and Mette Andersen “Safeguarding corporate social responsibility (CSR) in 
global supply chains: how codes of conduct are managed in buyer-supplier relationships” (2006) 6 J Publ 
Aff 228 at 229. 
47 S Roberts “Supply chain specific? Understanding the patchy success of ethical sourcing initiatives.” 
(2003) 44(2) Journal of Business Ethics 159 at 163. 
48 Pedersen and Andersen, above n 46, at 230. 
49 Pedersen and Andersen, above n 46, at 231 and 237. 
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Suppliers too may be reluctant to comply with codes of conduct. The benefits gained 
from practising CSR are often not evenly distributed among supply chains. The 
reputation built around good ethical conduct is often attached to a particular brand, 
which is held by only one of the companies within the chain. While this company reaps 
the full benefits of CSR practices, other companies within the supply chain would only 
get indirect benefits (such as increased business), while also having to bear the costs of 
implementing the CSR measures.50 Furthermore, many manufacturing companies act 
as suppliers for different distributors and brands, all of which may have varying CSR 
standards. It may then be difficult for one supplier to enforce all these varying standards 
within one company. This may entice suppliers to breach codes of conduct with poor 
practice of CSR in order to maximise profits.  
 
Companies often employ internal and third-party auditors to conduct audits within the 
supply chain and report on compliance with codes of conduct. However, audits can be 
unreliable, as accurate monitoring of daily work conditions and environmental practices 
of hundreds or thousands of contractors based in multiple parts of the world can be 
practically and financially overwhelming.51 On numerous occasions, audit reports have 
been found to contain inaccurate information. For instance, one report of a garment 
factory in Pakistan cited work conditions and safety standards to be compliant with 
those of the SA18000. But three weeks later, nearly 300 people were killed in a fire in 
the very same factory due to horrific safety conditions which breached even the most 
basic safety standards.52 Such events illustrate the complications and difficulties faced 
when implementing CSR measures across global supply chains. The inadequacy of 
existing measures therefore exemplifies the need for more reliable and enforceable CSR 
measures.  
D The Relationship between the TPP and CSR  
The fact that CSR provisions are found within the TPP indicates that CSR has been a 
relevant and influential factor in shaping the overall framework of the TPP. The TPP 
was drafted amidst much secrecy, with little transparency,53 making it difficult to 
ascertain the factors which were most influential during the drafting process. However, 
it may be presumed that CSR principles relating to labour and the environment played 
an important role, owing to the fact that CSR is expressly provided for in multiple 
  
50 Pedersen and Andersen, above n 46, at 230.  
51 Barbara J Fick “Corporate Social Responsibility, Free Trade and the Trans-Pacific Partnership” (29 
June 2015) The CLS Blue Sky Blog <http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu>. 
52 American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations Responsibility Outsourced: Social 
Audits, Workplace Certification and Twenty Years of Failure to Protect Worker Rights (April 2013) at 
4. 
53 Joseph E Stiglitz “On the Wrong Side of Globalization” The New York Times (online ed, New York, 
15 March 2014). 
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chapters of the Agreement.54 This approach reflects the new cultural and commercial 
attitude that profit-making interests of shareholders are unlikely to be achieved unless 
regard is had to other stakeholders.55 A similar approach was taken when the United 
Kingdom Companies Act was drafted to require directors to have regard to CSR-related 
obligations, such as the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment.56  
 
It is possible that CSR principles played a similar role in causing the TPP to be drafted 
in a manner which broadened the scope of duties imposed upon countries. Prior to the 
TPP, only a handful of FTAs explicitly contained CSR provisions within their text,57 
making the TPP one of the first multilateral trade agreements to include CSR 
provisions. Therefore it can be inferred that CSR has been a relevant factor in the TPP 
drafting process. Thereon, it follows that CSR is intended to be taken into consideration 
when giving effect to the relevant provisions of the TPP, to subsequently improve CSR 
practices within TPP countries. Accordingly, the following chapters of this paper 
examine these relevant provisions of the TPP and their potential to administer more 
effective CSR measures. 
 
III How Can the TPP Affect CSR?  
 
The TPP contains 30 chapters (and numerous annexes) which extensively provide for 
various aspects of international trade. However, only certain provisions within the TPP 
have been identified as having a noteworthy effect on CSR. Accordingly, only these 
provisions and their effects are examined in this paper. The Agreement contains two 
separate chapters solely dedicated to labour and environment issues. As these issues 
form the core of CSR obligations, their impact on CSR will be discussed separately in 
the following two chapters of this paper.  
A Champions CSR and Encourages Future Use 
The TPP is an avant-garde legal instrument containing multiple provisions which 
expressly call for the promotion of CSR. These provisions, contained within 
Investment, Labour and Environment Chapters of the Agreement, oblige Parties to 
encourage enterprises operating within their jurisdiction to voluntarily adopt CSR 
  
54 Such as the Labour, Environment and Investment chapters.  
55 Rachel C Tate “Section 172 CA 2006: the ticket to stakeholder value or simply tokenism?” (2012) 3 
Aberdeen Student L Rev 112 at 113. 
56 Companies Act 2006 (UK), s 172(1)(d).  
57 Such as the United States-Peru Free Trade Agreement (2009) and the Canada-Peru Free Trade 
Agreement (2009).  
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practices.58 The express inclusion of CSR provisions in an expansive multilateral 
agreement such as the TPP makes a clear statement as to its importance. Negotiating 
CSR provisions at the same time as the trade and investment provisions spotlights CSR 
issues (which are otherwise allocated backseats) and sends a signal to both signatory 
and non-signatory States that CSR is central to trade and investment activities.59  
 
Highlighting the importance of CSR through international trade agreements can also 
have a ripple effect, causing CSR provisions to be more frequently included in similar 
(national and international) agreements in future. A survey of numerous international 
investment agreements found that the use of CSR subsequently increased in countries 
that had included environment and labour provisions within their agreements.60 
Similarly, the inclusion of environmental provisions in the NAFTA lead to the inclusion 
of environmental agreements in all subsequent regional trade agreements negotiated by 
the United States (such as those with Singapore, Chile, Australia, Bahrain and 
Morocco).61 Accordingly, it is possible that the inclusion of CSR in the TPP could 
likewise increase its use in future agreements and further publicise CSR.  
 
Such trends can consequently induce countries to become accepting of such standards 
in future agreements. For instance, when Chile first entered into trade agreements with 
Canada and the United States, the country had no choice but to accept the stringent 
environmental provisions which supplemented the agreements. However all subsequent 
agreements and their environmental provisions were voluntarily accepted because the 
country had come to expect trade agreements to contain appropriate environmental 
provisions.62 Perhaps, the inclusion of CSR provisions in trade agreements would, in 
time, prompt States and corporations to accept and implement such provisions without 
objection.   
 
There is of course no evidence to show that omitting to include CSR provisions in trade 
agreements has a detrimental effect on CSR implementation. Countries, such as Brazil, 
do not include CSR provisions in their trade agreements and nonetheless have strong 
CSR programmes.63 In these instances, it is important to note that the inclusion of CSR 
  
58 Trans-Pacific Partnership, arts 9.17, 19.7 and 20.10. 
59 United Nations Environment Programme, above n 9, at 34. 
60 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development International Investment Law: 
Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations (OECD Publishing, Paris, 2008) at 136. 
61 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Environment and Regional Trade 
Agreements (OECD Publishing, Paris, 2007) at 25. 
62 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 61, at 46. 
63 United Nations Environment Programme, above n 9, at 28. 
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provisions can help further improve and polish up existing CSR practices to achieve 
higher CSR standards. 
 
Despite these advantages of the CSR provisions, there are also some drawbacks. The 
TPP does not explicitly instruct States as to how, and to what extent, CSR initiatives 
should be promoted. This is left to the discretion of States, which would allow them to 
be compliant with this provision according to the lowest possible standards with 
minimal effort. However discretion may also be beneficial as it gives flexibility for 
States to develop and implement the most suitable CSR initiatives which can be funded 
and implemented by corporations within their territory at a comfortable pace. 
Furthermore, there would be a backlash if the TPP dictated CSR practices which 
consequently proved to be unsuitable or unreasonably taxing on businesses or the 
economy (which would then undermine the very purpose of the free trade agreement).64 
Therefore the TPP strikes a good balance by requiring States to promote CSR while 
granting them autonomy to decide how this should be done, to ensure the best outcome.  
B How Can States Promote CSR?  
The TPP specifically instructs States to encourage enterprises to voluntarily adopt CSR 
practices thereby preventing States from legally obliging their adoption. Therefore 
companies cannot be forced to implement CSR measures if they do not wish to do so. 
While this may seem counterproductive, leaving implementation at the discretion of 
companies may have its advantages. Studies have found that corporate governance 
policies that promote CSR through internal coordination are more effective than 
traditional “command-and-control” approaches.65 Empirical evidence also shows 
corporations to be more willing to consider means of enforcing compliance when they 
are allowed to operate and perform their own monitoring.66 Therefore, the less-
dictatorial approach of the TPP may in fact further encourage the adoption of CSR 
practices among corporations.  
 
An important issue in this regard is how States should encourage companies to adopt 
CSR practices without pressuring them to neglect their profit-making objectives. One 
possible method is for States to introduce non-binding CSR codes, similar to codes of 
good governance. Codes of good governance are implemented on the basis of “comply 
or explain”, whereby States give companies the choice of complying with the code or 
providing reasons as to why they have not been complied with.67 A similar approach 
  
64 United Nations Environment Programme, above n 9, at 31. 
65 Gill, above n 18, at 465. 
66 Gill, above n 18, at 465. 
67 Ruth V Aguilera and Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra “Codes of Good Governance” (2009) 17(3) Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 376 at 383. 
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could be adopted to encourage the implementation of CSR codes within TPP Parties. 
Companies with the highest levels of compliance could be rewarded by being awarded 
grants, funding, recognition, publicity or other prizes to incite compliance.  
 
States can also facilitate complaint and dialogue channels for stakeholders to alert 
corporations of relevant issues, and encourage the establishment of CSR board 
committees and business ethics units within corporations. In this manner, the adoption 
of CSR practices remains voluntary and at the discretion of companies, but at the same 
time, prevents them from completely disregarding government initiatives. 
 
Additionally, States could provide funding and facilities for research and education on 
the benefits of CSR. Where States have identified the most effective CSR practices for 
their country, initiatives could be taken to disseminate them to the public. Many 
enterprises are found to value principles and guidelines proposed by public authorities, 
as it serves as a benchmark their own policies and performance, and also promotes a 
level playing field.68 Therefore States could introduce such policies through model 
laws, guidelines and action plans which could be voluntarily adopted. In addition to 
domestic policies, States could also endorse and promote internationally recognised 
CSR initiatives.69  
 
Some States have introduced legal regulation to compel companies to report on their 
CSR performance and social and environmental practices. The German and Belgian 
governments require investments to report on the environmental and social 
performance. French legislation requires certain publicly traded French companies to 
report on their social and environmental practices.70 Similar measures could be adopted 
within TPP States to compel CSR reporting and encourage companies to improve their 
CSR results. A 2011 survey has found that most companies located within TPP Parties 
such as New Zealand, Singapore, Mexico, Chile and Canada have failed to adequately 
implement or report on their CSR efforts.71 The survey also found that small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and trade and retail industry sectors are less inclined 
to report on their CSR efforts as opposed to larger businesses.72 Therefore it is important 
that these States intensify their efforts to encourage reporting, especially within SMEs 
  
68 European Commission, above n 34, at 7. 
69 Such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, United Nations Global Compact and ISO 
26000 standards.  
70 United Nations Environment Programme, above n 9, at 33. 
71 KPMG International KPMG International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2011 
(Publication number 110973, November 2011) at 5. 
72 KPMG International, above n 71, at 11 and 13.  
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and trade sectors, which are highly likely to take advantage of the free trade provisions 
of the TPP.  
 
Parties could also require State-owned enterprises to adopt and implement CSR 
measures to set a good example to privately-owned companies, as in the case in New 
Zealand.73 Where companies have followed up on these initiatives, States could reward 
them by awarding prizes and recognition to commend and publicise their CSR efforts. 
This initiative has proved to be successful in the EU, where it has enhanced CSR 
collaboration between enterprises and stakeholders, produced innovative CSR 
measures and raise global awareness on the positive impact that business can have on 
society.74 The TPP provisions could have similar results if such initiatives are taken by 
the Parties.   
 
Advocating CSR through multinational fora has proved to be successful on previous 
occasions. A policy published by the European Commission provided support to 
promote CSR principles by facilitating awareness-raising, best practice exchange, 
cooperation among Member States, research and education, not unlike the TPP.75 
Evidence suggests that the policy has played a significant part in successfully 
encouraging more EU companies to implement CSR initiatives.76 The TPP, which 
offers similar channels of support, could have a similar positive effect on companies 
within its territory.  
C Interpretation of the TPP 
The interpretation of a treaty, according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, should be conducted in light of its object and purpose.77 It has been 
recommended that tribunals interpreting the agreement can guide themselves according 
the purpose expressed in the title and the preamble.78  
 
The preamble of the TPP provides for high levels of environmental protection through 
effective enforcement of environmental laws, the promotion of sustainable 
development through good environmental practices and the protection and 
improvement of labour rights, working conditions and living standards.79 This 
  
73 As previously mentioned on page 11, the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 (NZ) requires State-
owned enterprises to act in a socially responsible manner.  
74 CSR Europe "European CSR Awards" <www.csreurope.org>. 
75 European Commission, above n 34, at 4. 
76 European Commission, above n 34, at 4-5.  
77 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (opened for signature 23 May 1969, 
entered into force 27 January 1980), art 31(1). 
78 Siemens AG v the Argentine Republic (Jurisdiction) ICSID ARB/02/08, 3 August 2004 at [81]. 
79 Trans-Pacific Partnership, preamble.  
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preambular inclusion of issues which are closely related to CSR obligations is useful, 
as it allows TPP provisions to be interpreted in the light of such CSR commitments. 
Parties and adjudicators could refer to the preamble for guidance, and in the event of a 
dispute involving labour or environmental elements, tribunals may decide matters in a 
manner that favours upholding and promoting CSR principles. This is not unheard of, 
as similar content within preambles of international trade agreements have been taken 
into consideration in previous arbitral cases. In S D Myers, Inc v Canada,80 an arbitral 
decision regarding NAFTA provisions, the tribunal concluded that the provisions 
should be interpreted in the light of the environmental clauses contained within its 
preamble. Accordingly, disputes relating to labour or environmental concerns within 
the TPP may also be resolved in consistence with the CSR principles contained within 
its preamble.  
D National Treatment for Originating Goods  
The TPP requires Parties to award national treatment for goods imported from and 
exported to other TPP Parties,81 by eliminating customs duties and prohibiting export 
subsidies. These measures are intended to bring down trade-barriers and increasing 
cross-border trade, which could have several impacts on the CSR practices of 
companies within TPP countries.  
1 Favourable treatment for originating goods  
Under TPP provisions, customs duties are eliminated for “originating goods”,82 thereby 
granting them favourable treatment over non-originating goods (which are, for instance, 
produced or sourced outside the territory of a TPP Party).83 If the CSR provisions of 
the TPP are effective in encouraging the adoption of CSR practices of companies within 
TPP States, originating goods are likely to be produced by businesses which are more 
socially responsible. Subsequently, originating goods would be more ethically 
produced as opposed to non-originating goods. Preferential treatment awarded to 
originating goods can cause an increase in the export and import of originating goods 
within TPP territories, which are then more widely circulated among the TPP countries. 
Owing to this, the TPP indirectly favours goods which have been produced by CSR-
compliant businesses. This may subsequently compel competing businesses, which 
export non-originating goods, to adopt similar CSR standards to compete in a more 
ethical market.  
  
80 S D Myers, Inc v Canada (Award) Bryan P Schwartz, Edward C Chiasson, J Martin Hunter 13 
November 2000 at [220]. 
81 Trans-Pacific Partnership, art 2.3.  
82 Article 3.2 defines originating goods as goods which are wholly sourced or produced within the 
territory of a TPP Party, or otherwise meet certain additional requirements set out in Chapter 3. 
83 Article 2.4. 
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Distributors and sellers would be more inclined to import goods from such businesses 
due to the free trade provisions of the TPP. To compete with these originating goods, 
exporters and producers of similar non-originating goods outside TPP territory would 
be compelled to make their products more attractive to importers within TPP countries. 
If they lower the prices of non-originating goods to match those of duty-free originating 
goods, originating goods would still have the additional advantage that they have been 
produced by socially responsible companies. Therefore, producers of non-originating 
goods would also have to be more CSR-compliant to compete with the standards of 
originating goods. In this manner, the TPP may also have an effect on CSR practices of 
companies operating beyond its territorial limits.   
 
The provisions relating to originating goods are also applicable to textile and apparel 
goods.84 They would favour businesses in, for instance, Vietnam, a major exporter of 
garments and textiles.85 Competing businesses in other countries with comparable 
garment and textile export, such as China, India or Bangladesh, could then accordingly 
be affected by these TPP provisions. The provisions could, in this instance, then affect 
business practice in some of the world’s largest economies.  
2 Prohibition of export subsidies 
The TPP prohibits Parties from granting export subsidies for goods destined to other 
Parties.86 Export subsidies are funds given by a State to a business to encourage export 
of goods. This prohibition of export subsidies will result in companies receiving less 
funds for business activities, including the administration of CSR measures within the 
company. Companies may be forced to cut down on costs in non-profit making areas 
of business, such as CSR programs. Furthermore, companies which produce goods for 
export are most likely to be suppliers at the bottom of the supply chain with little 
reputation attached to their brand, and may see no incentive to continue CSR practices 
with limited funds. Therefore, TPP provisions may hinder progress of CSR practice 
among suppliers primarily exporting goods to other Parties.   
E Investment 
The TPP encourages cross-border investment by awarding national treatment to 
investors of other Parties and their investments.87 The investment chapter also contains 
an express CSR provision whereby Parties are required to encourage investors from 
  
84 Trans-Pacific Partnership, art 4.2. 
85 “Strengths of the Vietnam textile and garment industry” (14 March 2016) Vietnam Trade Promotion 
Agency <www.vietrade.gov.vn>. 
86 Trans-Pacific Partnership, art 2.21. 
87 Article 9.4. 
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other TPP Parties (operating within its territory or jurisdiction) to voluntarily adopt CSR 
principles which it endorses or supports.88 This can include foreign investors who may 
otherwise be unwilling to incorporate CSR measures if they are unfamiliar to them or 
have not been tested in their home countries.  
 
It is likely that foreign investors will be more inclined to implement CSR within 
business policies where they are encouraged by the host State. The fact that the CSR 
practices that are promoted are endorsed by the State gives them a degree of 
accreditation regarding their effectiveness or suitability within that country, which may 
be attractive to foreign investors. Implementing locally recognised measures can also 
benefit investors as they are more likely to be acknowledged and recognised by local 
shareholders, other stakeholders and consumers. States also stand to benefit from 
foreign investors implementing CSR measures for business activity which takes place 
with its jurisdiction, as it would offer greater protection of its employees and the 
environment. But the fact that States can only encourage and not compel 
implementation of CSR minimises the effectiveness of this provision to some extent. 
 
When encouraging CSR under the Investment Chapter, it is important that States use 
techniques which are specifically tailored for foreign investors. One such successful 
initiative is that of the Dutch government’s Centre for the Promotion of Imports from 
developing countries (CBI). This Agency provides training to exporters from 
developing countries on codes of conduct and social and environmental issues and 
offers a website with extensive resources related to CSR.89 States may also endorse 
measures similar to those practised in the United States, by offering tax incentives and 
granting business licenses and permissions for foreign investors with a good CSR 
record, thereby inciting them to take on CSR practices.  
F Dispute Settlement  
Disputes among Parties which relate to the application or interpretation of provisions 
of the TPP may be resolved under Chapter 28, which allows Parties to take action 
against other Parties for conduct which is inconsistent with TPP provisions. Breach of 
TPP provisions relating to labour, the environment and CSR are therefore actionable 
under this Chapter. An independent Panel will issue a decision that binds both Parties, 
and non-compliance is penalised by compensation to the complaining Party or 
suspension of benefits to the responding Party.90 This Chapter could therefore have an 
impact on CSR in the several ways.  
 
  
88 Articles 9.2 and 9.17. 
89 United Nations Environment Programme, above n 9, at 28. 
90 Trans-Pacific Partnership, arts 28.3, 28.7, 28.19 and 28.20. 
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Firstly, the dispute settlement process serves as a preventive measure where a breach 
of obligations under the TPP is imminent. A State is less likely to breach labour, 
environment and CSR obligations where there is a prospect that such a breach is 
actionable under dispute settlement procedures. This may pressure States to conform to 
TPP requirements by proper adherence to labour and environmental standards and 
encouragement of CSR measures. In regard to the CSR provisions, results of 
encouraging practice of CSR is most likely to be seen if enterprises actively introduce 
and practice CSR in the course of business. States are therefore likely to put in 
substantial efforts to achieve these results and demonstrate compliance to other Parties.  
 
Secondly, action can be taken against failure to comply with TPP requirements. If a 
Party does not meet the required labour or environment standards or fails to promote 
and encourage CSR among enterprises, other concerned Parties may take action against 
the responding State. The dispute settlement Panel may then direct the responding Party 
to take appropriate steps to encourage CSR and meet TPP standards. This may include 
amending relevant domestic laws or introducing new measures which effectively 
satisfy TPP requirements.  
 
Thirdly, the penalties awarded under this chapter serve as an incentive for States to 
comply with orders of the dispute settlement Panel. The prospect of facing penalties 
(such as compensation and suspension of benefits) for non-compliance with Panel 
orders would compel Parties to conform to the directions of the dispute settlement Panel 
by improving the relevant labour, environment or CSR standards.  
 
In these regards, Chapter 28 effectively holds States responsible for their CSR 
obligations under the TPP. However, the provisions of this chapter do not provide a 
means of holding enterprises themselves accountable, even under domestic laws. The 
incorporation of CSR principles is merely voluntary for enterprises and their adoption 
is left to the discretion of enterprises. Therefore provisions under this chapter may not 
be effective even where States fulfil their obligations of encouraging and promoting 
CSR, and the incorporation of CSR is therefore completely dependent on how 
persuasive and encouraging States can be.  
G Assistance for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises  
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) can often be reluctant to implement and 
practice CSR as they lack the funding, time and human capital (employees), due to their 
smaller size and turnover. Therefore they rely on public actors such as their 
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governments to support their CSR initiatives.91 The TPP assists SMEs in this regard by 
requiring States to support them by providing a summary of the TPP and any relevant 
information.92 States are also required to establish a Committee on SMEs to help them 
benefit from TPP provisions (including CSR provisions).93 These provisions may allow 
SMEs to obtain advice and assistance from the State regarding appropriate CSR 
practices and consequently adopt those which are most suitable for their enterprise.  
H A Level Playing Field  
It is often difficult for CSR principles to expand beyond the boundaries of its originating 
State due to various differences between countries. A study conducted in 2008 
identified that some of the most prominent obstacles to the diffusion of CSR were 
cultural differences, language differences and inadequacy of communication and 
information tools.94 Foreign investors and importers may also not have knowledge of 
relevant CSR guidelines and regulations in their other countries and may have to rely 
on local NGOs to retrieve that information.95 This can be time consuming and difficult 
to communicate to suppliers abroad, making it difficult to adopt or to cooperate on CSR 
measures. The TPP addresses these issues by providing a platform for sharing and 
discussion through contact points and committees,96 and accordingly mitigates 
communication barriers. 
 
The study also found corruption to be a major obstacle to implementing CSR measures 
in developing countries, and companies often do not have a policy to deal with 
corruption overseas.97 The TPP can also assist in this regard as it contains anti-
corruption provisions to counter such problems.98 In this manner, the TPP levels the 
playing field between the Parties, thereby allowing CSR measures to easily diffuse 
between TPP Parties.  
  
91 Jamal El Baz and others “Influence of National Institutions on the Corporate Social Responsibility 
Practices of Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises in the Food-processing Industry: Differences between 
France and Morocco” (2016) 134(1) J Bus Ethics 117 at 119. 
92 Trans-Pacific Partnership, art 24.1. 
93 Article 24.2. 
94 Francesco Ciliberti, Pierpaolo Pontrandolfo and Barbara Scozzi “Investigating corporate social 
responsibility in supply chains: a SME perspective” (2008) 16 Journal of Cleaner Production 1579 at 
1584. 
95 Ciliberti, Pontrandolfo and Scozzi, above n 94, at 1586. 
96 These provisions are examined in more detail in the labour and environment chapters of this paper.  
97 Ciliberti, Pontrandolfo and Scozzi, above n 94, at 1586. 
98 Trans-Pacific Partnership, chapter 26. 
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I Overall Effects  
As examined above, the TPP can greatly benefit CSR practices in numerous different 
ways. Although the Agreement does not authorise Parties to legally enforce CSR 
practices among enterprises, it is likely that CSR measures will ultimately be adopted 
due to increasing influence from States, consumers and competing businesses. 
Therefore, it is concluded that the TPP does have a beneficial effect on CSR, albeit in 
an indirect manner.  
 
IV Protection of Labour Rights  
 
The TPP dedicates an entire chapter for better protection of labour rights within TPP 
states. This chapter explores the present labour standards within TPP Parties and 
discusses how the provisions of the TPP may affect these standards for better or for 
worse.  
A Current Labour Standards of the TPP Parties  
Current labour standards within the TPP Parties are greatly varied. Whilst some States 
such as New Zealand, Singapore and Chile generally conform to labour standards set 
out in the ILO Conventions,99 the same cannot be said of other States.  
 
Although developed countries including Australia, Canada and Japan are compliant 
with most ILO Conventions, corporations have been found to abuse employees in other 
aspects. Foreign workers employed by Australian companies are regularly underpaid 
and exploited, and major Australian corporations have been found to have used 
temporary visa provisions to evade the consequences of such conduct under domestic 
laws.100 In Canada, certain provincial laws allow children over the age of 12 to work in 
any industry, with no restrictions on the type of occupation, tasks undertaken or the 
time of work.101 Similar laws in the United States allow child labourers working in 
agricultural sectors to be exposed to hazardous working conditions which are 
overlooked by the State.102 In Japan, foreign workers employed to intern at Japanese 
companies are found to work under poor working conditions for a pay below the 
minimum wage.103 In these instances, disadvantaged employees are not adequately 
  
99 Some inconsistencies are nevertheless present within these States, especially with regard to various 
freedom of association and collective bargaining rights.  
100 United States Labour Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy Report on the 
Impacts of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (2 December 2015) at 69.  
101 Above n 100, at 73.  
102 Jo Becker “Child Laborers. In America. In 2014.” (17 September 2014) Human Rights Watch 
<www.hrw.org>. 
103 Above n 100, at 76. 
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protected by domestic laws. It is therefore the responsibility of the employing company 
to ensure that employees are treated fairly by exceeding their legal obligations and being 
socially responsible.  
 
Developing countries such as Brunei, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru and Vietnam also have 
inadequate labour laws to protect domestic and migrant workers. Corporations based in 
these countries then exploit these lax domestic laws to engage in forced labour,104 as 
well as child labour.105 For instance, large electronics companies such as Intel and Dell 
source the production of parts from Malaysia, where they have been produced by forced 
labour conditions; employers detain important documents and passports belonging to 
employees, leaving them trapped in employment with no access to justice.106 In 
Mexico, companies enter into contracts with employer-dominated Unions without the 
consent of their employees, who are then subject to unfair terms of these contracts 
against their will.107 The Peruvian government has also failed to enforce its labour laws, 
and consequently, goods produced for export in the garment, textile and agriculture 
sectors are often sourced from forced labour and child labour.108 Meanwhile, Brunei 
exercises strict labour laws which actively prevents workers from exercising their 
fundamental rights. For instance, exercise of rights relating to freedom of association 
and collective bargaining is prohibited and failure to adhere may result in harsh 
punishment or indefinite detention without trial.109 In these instances, it is evident that 
these TPP Parties have failed to adequately implement and uphold fundamental labour 
rights at the domestic level.  
 
The improved labour standards under TPP provisions could perhaps fill this regulatory 
gap by obliging States to promote CSR, thereby indirectly compelling companies to 
offer better protection of labour rights by adopting and implementing appropriate CSR 
measures. In addition, the United States has signed Labour Consistency Plans with 
  
104 Forced labour is defined according to the Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (ILO 
No 29) 39 UNTS 55 (opened for signature 28 June 1930, entered into force 1 May 1932). Forced labour 
includes all involuntary work or services provided to a private or third party under the threat of some 
form of penalty. The work or services provided need not be illegal under State or international law as the 
illegality relates to the nature of the employment relationship.  
105 Above n 100, at 76-83 and 87-88; United States Department of Labor “List of Goods Produced by 
Child Labor or Forced Labor: Vietnam” (2014) <www.dol.gov>; United States Department of Labor 
“List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor: Malaysia” (2014) <www.dol.gov>. 
106 Malaysia Investment Development Authority “Top 10 US Companies in Malaysia” (2012) 
<www.mida.gov.my>. 
107 Above n 100, at 80; Richard Marosi “Product of Mexico” Los Angeles Times (online ed, Los Angeles, 
7 December 2014). 
108 Above n 100, at 85.  
109 Above n 100, at 71.  
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Brunei, Vietnam and Malaysia to amend the shortcomings in their domestic laws.110 
Where these Consistency Plans compel States to improve the protection of labour 
rights, this also can set an example to companies to follow in the footsteps of the State 
by improving their own labour standards by being socially responsible. 
B Does the TPP Affect these Labour Standards? 
The TPP contains numerous provisions (including an express CSR provision) which 
can not only improve labour standards within the Parties but also improve CSR 
practices of companies within these States. These provisions and their effects are 
examined below.  
1 Labour obligations imposed by the TPP 
The labour provisions of the TPP embody the four fundamental labour rights set out in 
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.111 The 
fundamental rights represented in the Declaration are the freedom of association and 
right to collective bargaining, elimination of forced or compulsory labour, abolition of 
child labour and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation.112 All Parties are required to adopt and maintain these rights their domestic 
legal systems. The rights promoted by the Declaration stem from eight ILO 
Conventions,113 and are intended to be recognised by all ILO Member States (including 
States which have not ratified the Conventions). The Declaration itself is not 
enforceable; only the complementary Conventions can be enforced if they are ratified 
by a State. All the TPP Parties, however, have not ratified all eight ILO Conventions.114 
Therefore, these rights cannot be enforced within certain Parties. For example, Brunei 
  
110 Further detail regarding the Labour Consistency Plans can be found on the website of the United 
States Trade Representative at <https://ustr.gov/tpp>. 
111 International Labour Organisation Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (18 
June 1998). 
112 Trans-Pacific Partnership, arts 19.2.1 and 19.3.1. 
113 Namely, Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (ILO No 105) 320 UNTS 291 (opened for signature 
25 June 1957, entered into force 17 January 1959); Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory 
Labour (ILO No 29) 39 UNTS 55 (opened for signature 28 June 1930, entered into force 1 May 1932); 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (ILO No 111) 362 UNTS 31 (opened for 
signature 25 June 1958, entered into force 15 June 1960); Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise Convention (ILO No 87) 68 UNTS 17 (opened for signature 9 July 1948, entered into 
force 4 July 1950); Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (ILO No 98) 96 UNTS 257 
(opened for signature 1 July 1949, entered into force 18 July 1951); Convention concerning the 
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (ILO No 182) 
2133 UNTS 161 (opened for signature 17 June 1999, entered into force 19 November 2000); Convention 
Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (ILO No 138) 1015 UNTS 297 (entered into 
force 19 June 1976); Equal Remuneration Convention (ILO No 100) 165 UNTS 303 (opened for 
signature 29 June 1951, entered into force 23 May 1953).  
114 <www.ilo.org>. 
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and the United States have collectively not ratified seven of the eight fundamental 
conventions.115 Moreover, some of the fundamental conventions have not been ratified 
by at least five of the 12 TPP Parties and cannot be enforced within their jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the inclusion of these fundamental rights within the text of the TPP compels 
all TPP Parties to adopt satisfactory domestic regulations to protect and maintain these 
rights.  This makes them enforceable within all TPP States, including States such as the 
United States and Brunei which have not ratified a majority of the conventions.  
 
It is contended that the protection of these fundamental rights by domestic law will 
compel corporations to put in more effort, not only to meet the higher legal standards 
but also to market themselves as being socially responsible. Domestic recognition of 
fundamental labour rights raises the bar of employee protection within that country. If 
legal standards are raised, this is raises the bar of CSR standards within the country 
(since CSR obligations require companies to go beyond their legal obligations). 
Accordingly, higher labour standards could improve labour-related CSR practices 
within TPP States.  
 
The provisions under the labour chapter (including the CSR provision) can be enforced 
by Parties by dispute settlement procedures under Chapter 28 of the TPP. In this regard, 
these labour provisions are more enforceable than those of previous FTAs,116 and are 
therefore more likely to compel States to comply with requirements under this 
chapter.117 Enforceable provisions have been effective in previous FTAs such as the 
Dominican Republic-Central America FTA. When the Guatemalan government failed 
to enforce its labour laws, the United States administration took the matter to arbitration 
to force the country to prosecute abusive employers and enforce its labour laws.118 The 
TPP could help hold States responsible in a similar manner and ensure that its labour 
laws are complied with, thereby improving labour and CSR standards within TPP 
countries. 
 
In addition to the fundamental rights, the TPP requires States to maintain acceptable 
conditions of work with regard to minimum wage, hours of work and occupational 
health and safety.119 However the Agreement does not specify what constitutes of 
  
115 Only the Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour (ILO No 182) 2133 UNTS 161 (opened for signature 17 June 1999, entered 
into force 19 November 2000) has been ratified by both Brunei and the United States.  
116 Such as those of the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, the United States-Singapore Free 
Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  
117 United States Trade Representative “TPP Chapter Summary: 19 Labor” (2015) 
<https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership> at 7. 
118 Editorial “Pacific Trade and Worker Rights” The New York Times (online ed, 21 November 2015). 
119 Trans-Pacific Partnership, art 19.3.2. 
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acceptable standards, and standards for each country are to be determined by each 
respective country. In this regard, even States which adopt and maintain very low 
standards will not breach provisions of the TPP. Countries such as Malaysia, Brunei 
and Singapore have low wages below the poverty line and unacceptable health and 
safety standards which are not addressed by the TPP.120 Corporations within these 
countries can then easily market themselves as being socially responsible by imposing 
labour standards just above the legal requirement. In this regard, the TPP has 
overlooked a golden opportunity to push States and companies to improve their CSR 
efforts in relation to minimum wage, hours of work and occupational health and safety.  
 
Whether the TPP will have an effect on CSR will therefore depend on the domestic 
measures adopted by each individual State. If States take the initiative to adopt high 
standards, domestic CSR standards will also automatically be raised, and companies 
will be compelled to put in more effort if they wish to market themselves as being 
socially responsible. Therefore, it is up to States to ensure that high levels of legal 
protection are afforded to employees.  
2 The CSR provision 
The TPP contains an express provision for CSR within the labour chapter. The 
provision is similar to that in the Investment chapter and requires each Party to 
encourage enterprises to voluntarily adopt CSR initiatives on labour issues which are 
endorsed or supported by that Party.121 Whilst this provision does not authorise States 
to coerce enterprises to adopt CSR practices, this is an important provision as it requires 
States to be more involved in CSR initiatives rather than leaving it up to corporations.  
 
When a State encourages the practice of labour-related CSR, this could send a clear 
signal to enterprises, as well as to shareholders and other stakeholders, that CSR is an 
important aspect of good business conduct. Uninformed employees affected by 
unethical business conduct would be made aware that the companies they work for have 
ethical obligations which exceed their legal responsibilities. Where they fail to meet 
fulfil these obligations, employees could then urge companies to adopt and implement 
better CSR practices. The involvement of States could also provide backing to 
interested groups such as trade unions, activists and human rights organisations who 
wish to influence and assist corporations adopt CSR measures.  
 
Similar to the investment chapter, the labour chapter of the TPP does not explicitly 
suggest any labour-related CSR measures which should be promoted. However, as 
  
120 United States Labour Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy, above n 100, at 
66. 
121 Article 19.7.  
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discussed in the previous chapter of this paper, this leaves room for States to promote 
measures which they deem to be most appropriate and effective within their 
jurisdiction. 
 
As States cannot legally oblige companies to adopt and implement CSR measures 
which are purely voluntary, there is a possibility that companies may choose to ignore 
the efforts of States to promote CSR within its jurisdiction. However, if CSR measures 
were made a legal requirement, this too may have damaging consequences. Where these 
legal requirements are too burdensome, corporations may threaten to close down the 
business or lay-off employees. The ratification of the NAFTA brought about such 
consequences, where US employers threatened to close down their plants, and 12% of 
the employers followed through with this threat, leaving numerous workers 
unemployed.122 The fact that CSR implementation is left to the discretion of employers 
may therefore prevent displeased employers from resorting to such drastic measures 
and may, in fact, be the more effective method of urging corporations to adopt CSR 
measures.   
3 Discouraging the production of goods by forced labour  
It is estimated that forced labour generates over 43 billion US dollars per year, and the 
Asia-Pacific region (which includes a majority of TPP States) accounts for 56% of this 
global total.123 The TPP requires Parties to discourage the import of goods which have 
been produced or sourced by forced labour or compulsory labour (including forced or 
compulsory child labour).124 This provision would allow Parties to ban the import of 
goods produced in countries such as Brunei, Malaysia, Mexico, Vietnam and Peru, 
where there is evidence that forced labour subsists. This provision greatly benefits the 
promotion of CSR as it can compel companies to act responsibly towards its employees 
even where it is not required by the respective domestic laws. Where domestic laws fail 
to adequately protect employees from forced or compulsory labour, companies would 
be driven to offer adequate protection and good treatment to ensure that their goods are 
not rejected or banned by other concerned Parties. The economic benefits offered by 
the TPP (through the elimination of trade barriers) and the prospect of obtaining good 
trade deals would be appealing to companies, and would encourage them to trade within 
TPP territory by conforming to TPP provisions. In this manner, the TPP could pressure 
companies to exceed their legal obligations and engage in ethical conduct and CSR.  
  
122 Kate Bronfenbrenner “We'll close! Plant closings, plant-closing threats, union organizing and 
NAFTA.” (1997) 18(3) Multinational Monitor 8 at 8. 
123 International Labour Office Profits and Poverty: The economics of forced labour (Geneva, 2014) at 
7 and 13. 
124 Trans-Pacific Partnership, art 19.6. 
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4 Assistance for implementing CSR   
Parties to the TPP are required to accept submissions from interested persons and 
provide them with access to tribunals to enforce provisions under the labour chapter.125 
This would allow disadvantaged employees and interested groups such as trade unions 
and NGOs to communicate with States on issues relating to CSR, giving them a voice 
in monitoring and enforcing rights.126 States could then use such feedback to address 
relevant issues and introduce and promote more appropriate and effective CSR 
measures. Where a State has failed to satisfy its obligation to assist enterprises with 
implementing CSR, these disadvantaged parties can take action through a tribunal to 
coerce the State to be more involved in CSR matters.  
 
TPP Parties are also required to cooperate and assist each other with the implementation 
of provisions within the labour chapter, and CSR is expressly listed as one possible area 
of cooperation.127 Cooperation may be enabled through workshops, seminars, research 
and even the exchange of technical expertise and assistance.128 Parties may also get 
advice from other Parties on matters relating to the labour chapter (including CSR 
matters).129 This can help developing countries such as Vietnam and Mexico, where 
CSR and labour rights may not be well protected and promoted. Developed countries 
such as New Zealand and Canada can advise and assist these countries with introducing 
more effective CSR measures related to labour issues.  
 
The TPP mandates that each Party should establish a Labour Council (composed of 
government officials) and contact points to facilitate communication and coordination 
between interested persons and Parties and between the Parties themselves.130 Each 
Labour Council is tasked with agreeing on a work programme for implementing the 
provisions of the labour chapter (including the CSR provision). As the Labour Council 
is composed of government officials, the government would be at the heart of 
promoting and encouraging CSR. Government officials are also likely to be well-
informed of labour rights violations within their country and would be able to 
recommend appropriate and effective CSR measures to counter these violations. The 
lack of capacity to negotiate and insufficient coordination between trade and labour 
ministries has proved to be a hurdle when determining appropriate CSR measures.131 
Contact points can address such issues by easing coordination between the relevant 
  
125 Trans-Pacific Partnership, arts 19.8 and 19.9.  
126 Fick, above n 51. 
127 Articles 19.10.1 and 19.10.6(t).  
128 Article 19.10.7. 
129 Article 19.11. 
130 Articles 19.12 and 19.13. 
131 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 61, at 39.  
31 The Trans-Pacific Partnership – A Bane or Boon to Corporate Social Responsibility? 
 
ministries which need to be involved. Enterprises that are interested in adopting CSR 
measures may also resort to contact points for advice regarding the most appropriate 
and effective CSR measures.  
 
The active involvement of the government in this manner would set a good example as 
a role model and may persuade private entities as well as other Parties to follow suit. 
The Labour Council is also required to accept views of interested persons on matters 
relating to the labour chapter, including the CSR provision.132 This is beneficial as it 
facilitates communication and input from CSR activists, trade unions and other experts 
in this field regarding labour violations and appropriate CSR responses.  
 
The above provisions enhance the importance of CSR by easing communication and 
coordination through the sharing of information. But it should be noted that the power 
to initiate good CSR under these provisions mostly lies within the State and the 
appointed officials. If a State or its Labour Council deems that CSR is not a priority for 
the State and its corporations, the Council may not allocate sufficient time and effort to 
address CSR issues. In most countries, the lack of motivation or opposition from higher 
levels of government has been identified as one of the main hurdles for the 
implementation of CSR.133 However, the fact that failure to fulfil labour obligations is 
actionable under the dispute resolution chapter of the TPP could encourage States to 
consider CSR within its domestic labour agenda.  
C Will the TPP Improve Labour-Related CSR Standards?  
The TPP sets high standards for the protection of labour rights. Consequently, it is likely 
that most labour-related CSR measures would then become legal requirements. 
Corporations would therefore be required to improve their labour protection efforts to 
market themselves as being socially responsible. The TPP assists in this regard, 
especially by means of the provisions which promote CSR and allow for cooperation 
between the Parties. Although these provisions have no binding effect, they can, in the 
very least, educate companies and encourage them to consider adopting CSR measures. 
Accordingly, it is concluded that the TPP can have a positive effect on CSR.  
 
V Protection of the Environment  
 
Corporations, both national and multinational, can have an immense impact on the 
environment over the course of business. Trade liberalisation brought about by FTAs 
can increase this impact on the environment as a result of increased sourcing, 
  
132 Trans-Pacific Partnership, art 19.14. 
133 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 61, at 39. 
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production and movement of goods. This is especially true in the case of businesses 
involving the sourcing or production of goods (such as mining, textile production or 
chemical manufacturing). Research suggests that increased trade can affect air quality 
(through increased emissions of harmful gases), the ozone layer, water bodies and 
ecosystems; discharge of toxic substances, global warming and waste production is 
expected to increase, adversely affecting human, animal and plant life.134 Existing 
national laws, which may not have previously regulated trade on such a large scale, may 
not address or prevent these impacts.  
 
Consequently, some businesses take matters into their own hands by adopting CSR 
measures to counter adverse environmental impacts. But not all corporations take the 
initiative to do so, thereby causing irreversible harm to the environment by discharging 
toxic waste, and causing damage and destruction to wildlife, habitats and the 
atmosphere. The improved environmental protection standards contained in the TPP 
may address these shortcomings and reduce harm caused to the environment by 
encouraging better CSR practices among corporations. This chapter explores how the 
TPP may bring about such change and promote better CSR practices relating to 
environmental protection.  
A Can International Trade Affect Environmental CSR Practices? 
A study conducted across 108 countries over a period of six years has found that 
increased international trade influenced the increased the adoption of ISO 14001 
standards,135 which are complementary to environmental CSR practices. It was found 
that where export destinations (importing countries) had a higher number of ISO 14001 
certifications, firms in exporting countries were also influenced to join this regime, 
resulting in a higher number of certifications within the exporting countries as well.136 
It can be inferred from this finding that buyers and importers can influence suppliers 
and exporters to adopt and implement CSR measures such as the ISO 14001. Given that 
the elimination of trade barriers under TPP provisions is likely to increase international 
trade between buyers and suppliers, international trade under TPP regulation can be 
used as a tool to introduce and improve environmental CSR measures in exporting 
countries.  
 
  
134 Japanese Study Group on Environment and Economic Partnership Agreements / Free Trade 
Agreements Guideline on Environmental Impact Assessment of Economic Partnership Agreements and 
Free Trade Agreements in Japan (English Summary) (Ministry of the Environment, Government of 
Japan, March 2004) at 6. 
135 Prakash and Potoski, above n 5, at 357. 
136 Prakash and Potoski, above n 5, at 357. 
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CSR practices can also be affected by foreign investments, which are provided for under 
Chapter 9 of the TPP. Multinational corporations are likely to want to adopt 
environmental CSR practices which are acceptable in all the countries they trade and 
invest in, to avoid costs of adapting different CSR models for each country. However 
domestic CSR measures are developed in an ad hoc manner and vary from country to 
country, limiting its coherence and making it confusing for business owners and 
consumers.137 Foreign investments may help in this regard by serving as a “vehicle” to 
transmit flexible environmental CSR practices,138 which are suitable for implementing 
across a number of countries. This is already found to be the case in international trade 
under bilateral trade agreements.139 If this is also true for multilateral agreements such 
as the TPP, corporations in countries with high inflows of foreign investments may be 
influenced by the investors to adopt these versatile and suitable CSR practices.  
B Environmental Obligations Imposed by the TPP 
The TPP requires Parties to aim for high levels of environmental protection but each 
Party has the discretion to determine the level of protection maintained within their 
country.140 All existing domestic laws are required to be strictly enforced and Parties 
are prohibited from derogating from these laws to encourage trade and investment.141 
Parties are also required to implement and enforce all multilateral environmental 
agreements which they have ratified.142 If these TPP provisions encourage States to 
implement strict environmental laws, they could consequently compel enterprises to be 
more accountable for their effects on the environment. Additionally, States can push 
corporations to practice better CSR to meet the high levels of environmental protection 
mandated by the TPP.  
 
The TPP also encourages engaging the public in the development of domestic 
environmental measures. For instance, arts 20.5 and 20.6 require Parties to 
accommodate “public participation and consultation … in the development and 
implementation of measures” concerning the protection of the ozone layer and marine 
environments.143 In addition to binding legal measures, it is possible that these measures 
could include voluntary CSR measures which have been endorsed by that respective 
State. In this case, public participation and consultation could include that of concerned 
corporations and organisations which have an effect on the environment. States could 
  
137 United Nations Environment Programme, above n 9, at 27. 
138 Prakash and Potoski, above n 5, at 354. 
139 Alan Rugman, Julie Soloway, and John Kirton Environmental Regulations and Corporate Strategy: 
A NAFTA Perspective (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) at 30. 
140 Trans-Pacific Partnership, art 20.3.2. 
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encourage the input of environmental organisations and experts who can recommend 
effective CSR measures. Company directors and other interested entities could draw 
attention to areas where CSR practice in this regard has not been successful and request 
States to assist and provide advice regarding better CSR measures. This may also 
pressure competing businesses to take similar steps. Corporations which take part in 
these consultations would be prompted to administer any ensuing State-recommended 
CSR measures at the company level, thus improving CSR practice within the 
organisation. 
 
The environment chapter also requires Parties to take measures to combat illegal trade 
in fauna and flora, by implementing stricter domestic laws and improving efforts to 
track down such trade.144 Businesses which obtain fauna or flora from suppliers within 
TPP territories may wish to demonstrate compliance with these domestic laws to avoid 
a tarnished reputation and possible legal consequences. Furthermore, businesses may 
also wish to ensure that their suppliers complied with these laws to prevent them from 
being decommissioned or penalised. It is likely that businesses would want to avoid the 
arduous task of finding new, reliable suppliers to replace the trusted, long-term 
suppliers they have lost. Compliance of suppliers can be administered by businesses 
only through CSR measures (overseen by mechanisms such as codes of conduct or 
regular audits). In this manner, the TPP compels such businesses sourcing from within 
TPP countries to improve their CSR standards. This provision is particularly important 
as TPP countries account for more than 25% of the global food trade and approximately 
25% of global timber and pulp production.145 Therefore it could have a tremendous 
effect on CSR on a large, international scale. This could also influence companies 
which source from suppliers from non-TPP countries. The sustainable sourcing within 
TPP countries may pressure competing businesses to ensure that their suppliers also 
comply with these standards. In this regard, the TPP may improve CSR standards both 
within and beyond its signatory States.  
 
Despite the numerous effective provisions contained within the TPP, the agreement is 
not without any negative effects. It has been identified that the TPP could have a 
negative impact on environmental CSR practices outside of the United Stated with 
regard to climate change. Provisions relating to climate change have, surprisingly, not 
been included in the TPP and therefore other Parties are not bound by such limitations. 
Only the United States is currently committed to have regard to climate change by 
limiting its carbon emissions (following the implementation of a bilateral agreement 
with China). Investors in other TPP Parties could therefore choose to profit from the 
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<https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership> at 6-8.  
35 The Trans-Pacific Partnership – A Bane or Boon to Corporate Social Responsibility? 
 
exclusion of climate change policies by exploiting cheap, high-emission processes, 
thereby undermining and thwarting other CSR efforts put forth by the TPP.  
C The CSR Provision  
The environment chapter of the TPP contains an express CSR provision, similar to that 
of the labour chapter, indicating that the drafters of the TPP considered it an important 
matter with regard to environmental as well as labour protection. The provision requires 
Parties to encourage enterprises to voluntarily adopt CSR principles that are related to 
the environment and are endorsed by that Party.146 Unlike the labour chapter however, 
the environment chapter goes on to propose some voluntary mechanisms (such as 
voluntary auditing and reporting, market-based incentives, voluntary sharing of 
information and expertise, and public-private partnerships) which can be adopted by 
the Parties.147 Where companies use environmental CSR measures to promote their 
products, Parties are also required to encourage them to be truthful and promote 
competition and innovation, and where possible, encourage compliance with 
international standards.148  
 
Similar to the labour CSR provision, these provisions get States, governmental officials 
and other experts directly involved in promoting and marketing CSR initiatives to 
corporations. The proposed voluntary mechanisms can even serve as a starting point or 
benchmark for States to draw up their own means of encouraging CSR. States may also 
be more willing to promote measures that have been endorsed by the TPP – they are 
pre-acknowledged by other TPP Parties therefore it would be easier to cooperate with 
these Parties when obtaining advice and assistance regarding their implementation. 
Businesses which wish to take advantage of the free trade policies within TPP territories 
are also more likely to want to adopt TPP-endorsed CSR practices. Traders who 
promote their goods in other TPP States based on their CSR practices may find it easier 
to do so with practices endorsed by the TPP. Consumers and competitors in other TPP 
States would be more familiar with the operation and effectiveness of these CSR 
standards they are also practised within their own country. In the best circumstances, 
this may even pressure competing businesses in other TPP States and beyond to adopt 
similar practices to compete on equal footing. In this regard, the TPP could persuade 
States to promote (and consequently encourage businesses to adopt) better 
environmental CSR standards.  
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D Enforcement by Dispute Settlement Procedures 
Similar to the labour chapter, provisions of the environment chapter (including the CSR 
provision) are subject to dispute resolution procedures if they are not complied with by 
a State.149 Again, this would be a strong incentive for States to effectively implement 
any environmental provisions related to CSR and would contribute towards better CSR 
practices among enterprises. However, a 2007 report found that environmental dispute 
settlement provisions in FTAs have never been exercised by States.150 For example, 
when provisions of the United States-Peru FTA were breached, there was a “systemic 
lack of enforcement” of the agreement,151 even though there was indisputable evidence 
that provisions of the agreement had been violated. Furthermore, dispute settlement 
provisions under the environment chapter are more onerous than the corresponding 
labour provisions. States are required to engage in three separate levels of consultation 
before commencing the dispute resolution process, which may discourage States from 
commencing action. Therefore, there is a possibility that dispute settlements under this 
chapter may not be enforced with regard to CSR provisions.  
 
However, there is anecdotal evidence that such procedural provisions act as deterrents 
to under-enforcement of environment laws. The United States-Singapore FTA, for 
instance, influenced Singapore to more effectively enforce its domestic laws in relation 
to illegal wildlife transhipment with legislation.152 The TPP dispute settlement 
provisions may serve a similar purpose in relation to the implementation of CSR 
provisions in the environment chapter. 
E Cooperation and Assistance for Implementation  
Numerous provisions of the environment chapter allow Parties to assist and cooperate 
with each other to satisfactorily fulfil TPP obligations, including those relating to CSR. 
Each Party is required to establish a contact point and an Environment Committee 
(composed of government representatives) to facilitate communication and cooperation 
in this regard.153 Parties may also cooperate and consult on matters related to the 
environment chapter,154 and cooperation may include providing technical assistance for 
training, conducting workshops and conferences, sharing best practices and policies and 
exchanging experts among Parties.155 These provisions would allow countries with 
  
149 Trans-Pacific Partnership, art 20.23. 
150 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 61, at 124. 
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weaker environmental policies to seek advice and assistance from countries with more 
stringent laws and higher levels of protection. In this manner, TPP Parties may also 
cooperate to determine the most effect CSR practices. As noted in the previous chapter 
of this paper, insufficient coordination between relevant ministries is one of the biggest 
problems faced when introducing CSR practices. The Environment Committee and 
contact points can expedite communication and coordination in this regard between 
trade and environment ministries of the Parties and between the governments of the 
Parties themselves.  
 
Parties are also required to consult on environmental matters with experienced and 
knowledgeable persons prior to the implementation of TPP obligations.156 Accordingly, 
States may consult with national advisory committees, environmental groups, non-
governmental organisations and even enterprises and businessmen prior to endorsing 
and promoting a particular CSR practice, to ensure that the most effective and 
appropriate measures are selected.  
F Public Submissions  
If environmental provisions relating to CSR are not implemented by a Party, interested 
persons (the public) from that Party may make a Public Submission to the Party under 
art 20.9.157 This would compel the violating Party to consult with the Environment 
Committee and implement the relevant provision within three years of the 
submission,158 thereby fast-tracking the promotion and implementation of CSR 
principles. Public submissions are also found to work more effectively than State-to-
State procedures. Governments may not be well-informed about environmental effects 
on all parts of the country, and affected citizens may bring them to light.159 Citizens 
may also be keen to ensure that environmental measures are complied with, especially 
where they are directly affected, for instance, by air pollution or toxic waste disposal in 
their neighbourhoods. Public submissions can also be more cost effective, especially in 
countries with limited financial resources. Where governments are unable to fund the 
monitoring of national environmental measures, citizens could do so at no cost to the 
State.  
Public submissions have also been effective in practice, bringing about improved 
environmental protection. For example, public submissions brought under the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) have resulted in 
improved environmental protection in countries such as Canada and Mexico.160 
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Although these submissions did not concern CSR matters, it is possible that similar 
action could be taken where CSR measures are not implemented. In some arbitral 
cases,161 public submissions have persuaded governments to deny permission for 
projects which can have a negative environmental impact.162 Where the public would 
generally not have a say in such matters (even though they are affected by business 
activities), public submissions provisions allow the public to voice their concerns. This 
can consequently pressure businesses to act more responsibly towards the public by 
adopting CSR practices to appease the public and ensure that their projects are 
approved.  
G Will the TPP Improve Environmental CSR Practices?  
The environment provisions greatly promote adoption of CSR initiatives within TPP 
States. The provisions for CSR and public submissions, in particular, may persuade 
corporations to adopt CSR practices. Accordingly, the TPP could have a beneficial 
impact on CSR with regard to environmental measures.  
 
VI Conclusion  
 
The above chapters illustrate the numerous effects, both positive and negative, that the 
TPP may have on CSR within and beyond the Party-States. However, the individual 
analyses of each area of impact (such as State participation, labour and the environment) 
indicate that the majority of potential effects are likely to have a positive and beneficial 
impact on CSR. Therefore, from a holistic perspective, it appears that that the TPP can 
benefit CSR.  
 
The CSR provisions within the TPP offer practical solutions to the existing concerns 
surrounding corporate accountability. By requiring States to actively engage in 
promoting and implementing CSR measures, the TPP manages to address the 
accountability deficit for the actions of companies in several ways. The TPP may 
compel States to introduce domestic CSR measures which bind the directors or 
managers of companies (in a manner similar to the Companies Act 2006 of the United 
Kingdom),163 thereby addressing any accountability deficit arising due to the corporate 
veil or the separate legal personality of the company. The multilateral nature of the 
Agreement and the import and export provisions related to CSR could help address 
some CSR issues beyond each individual State, thereby overcoming the lack of 
  
161 See, for example, Metalclad Corporation v Mexico (Award) ICSID ARB(AF)/97/1, 30 August 2000; 
Tecnica Mediambientales Tecmed SA v United Mexican States (Award) ICSID ARB(AF)/00/2, 29 May 
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jurisdiction to control activities beyond the State. Such regulation could also pressure 
companies to urge suppliers and subsidiaries to conform to TPP standards required by 
States. Where States introduce services to promote CSR (such as State-facilitated dialog 
channels, State-conducted audits and legal regulation of CSR reporting), they may 
prove to be more successful than the ineffective measures currently being practiced 
within companies (such as codes of conduct and internal audits). If the TPP ultimately 
improves the CSR practices of companies within its States, it would assist these 
companies achieve their primary profit-making objectives in the long run. 
 
There is a possibility that States may choose to ignore or deprioritise the promotion of 
non-legal CSR principles. Promotion requires money, labour and time, which 
developing countries such as Vietnam or Brunei may be unable to afford, leading to a 
stagnation of CSR efforts within these countries. Moreover, the fact that compliance 
with CSR provisions is merely voluntary could mean that business too could choose to 
ignore any measures put forth by States. Furthermore, it may be that the enforcement 
of the TPP CSR provisions will not have a positive practical effect in improving 
responsible corporate behaviour, as it only binds States and not the companies 
themselves, and therefore cannot hold companies responsible. 
 
Nonetheless, the enforcement of the CSR provisions could spotlight CSR issues and 
highlight its importance. This in itself is an initiative – a step further towards 
recognising the advantages CSR has to offer. The inclusion of CSR principles also 
broadens the group of people who have locus standi to voice their concerns. In this 
regard, the enforcement of the CSR provisions could serve a useful purpose in the long 
run. 
 
Accordingly, it is determined that the beneficial effects of the TPP outweigh any 
potential disadvantages it may have. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, it is 
concluded that the TPP is indeed a boon for CSR, at least within TPP territories.  
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